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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 118, Orig.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF v.
STATE OF ALASKA
on bill of complaint
[April 21, 1992]


  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Ever since the Nome gold rush of 1899 to 1901, the
Seward Peninsula in western Alaska has been a focus of
attempts to gain control over the region's natural riches.
See In re McKenzie, 180 U. S. 536 (1901).  The city of Nome
sprang to life almost overnight, with some 20,000 gold
seekers arriving by vessel in the summer of 1900 when the
spring thaw opened up seaward passage.  Since that time,
Nome has never been linked to interior Alaska by
road-travelers and traders must arrive by air, sea, or dog
sled.  This heavy reliance on seaward traffic, and the lack
of a natural port in the region, inspired Nome in the early
1980's to develop plans to construct port facilities, including
a causeway with road, a breakwater, and an offshore
terminal area, extending into Norton Sound.  The implica-
tions of this construction for the federal-state offshore
boundary lie at the heart of this lawsuit, which comes to us
on a bill of complaint filed by the United States.  The
question presented is whether the Secretary of the Army
may decline to issue a permit to build an artificial addition
to the coastline unless Alaska agrees that the construction
will be deemed not to alter the location of the federal-state
boundary.
                            I
  On August 25, 1982, the city of Nome applied for a
federal permit to build port facilities with the Alaska
District Corps of Engineers of the United States Depart-
ment of the Army under 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA), 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U. S. C.
403, and 404 of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 884, as
amended, 33 U. S. C. 1344.  The Corps issued a Public
Notice of Application for Permit on October 20, 1982, and
invited interested persons to comment on whether the
permit should be granted.  On November 22, 1982, a
division of the United States Department of the Interior
filed an objection to the issuance of a Department of the
Army permit on the ground that Nome's construction of
these port facilities would cause an ``artificial accretion to
the legal coast line.''  Joint Stipulation of Facts 2.  It
requested that the Corps require Alaska to waive any
future claims pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act (SLA),
6 7 Stat. 29, as amended, 43 U. S. C. 1301 et seq., that
might arise from a seaward extension of Alaska's coastline
caused by the building of these facilities.  The Solicitor of
the Interior Department issued an opinion to the same
effect, stating that the Nome project would ```move Alaska's
coastline or baseline seaward of its present location''' and
that ```[f]ederal mineral leasing offshore Alaska would be
affected because the state-federal boundary, as well as
international boundaries, are measured from the coastline
or baseline.'''  Joint Stipulation of Facts 2-3.  Accordingly,
the Solicitor recommended that ```approval of the permit
application be conditioned upon Alaska executing an
agreement or a quit claim deed preserving the coastline and
the state-federal boundary.'''  Id., at 3.
  On July 1, 1983, the Corps transmitted the Solicitor's
letter to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources and
advised the State that the federal permit would not be
issued until a ```waiver or quit claim deed has been issued
preserving the coastline and the State-Federal boundary.'''
Ibid.  The Alaska Department of Natural Resources
responded on May 9, 1984, by submitting a conditional
disclaimer of rights to additional submerged lands that
could be claimed by the State as a result of the construction
of the Nome port facility.  This disclaimer provided that
Alaska reserved its right to the accreted submerged lands
pending a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction that
the federal officials lacked the authority to compel a
disclaimer of sovereignty as a condition of permit issuance.
After being advised by the Department of Justice that this
disclaimer was satisfactory, the Corps completed the
permitting process and issued the permit.
  On March 11, 1988, the Minerals Management Service of
the Interior Department published a ``Request for Com-
ments and Nominations for a Lease Sale in Norton Sound
and Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement,'' which solicited public comment on the Minerals
Management Service's proposed lease sale for minerals,
such as gold, near Nome in Norton Sound.  Id., at 5.
Alaska submitted comments the following month, alleging
that the proposed Norton Sound Lease Sale involved
submerged lands subject to its Nome project disclaimer and
announcing its intention to file a suit challenging the Corps'
authority to require a waiver of rights to submerged lands.
The State requested that the Minerals Management Service
delete from the proposed lease sale the approximately 730
acres in dispute from the Nome project.
  The United States then sought leave of this Court to
commence this action, which we granted on April 1, 1991.
499 U. S. ____.  The two parties entered into an agreement
pursuant to 7 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), 43 U. S. C. 1336, and Alaska Stat. Ann.
38.05.137 (1989), to direct revenues from the disputed
acreage into an escrow account that would then be paid to
the prevailing party.  The United States and Alaska both
filed motions for summary judgment, which we now
consider.
                           II
  Our principles for evaluating agency interpretations of
congressional statutes are by now well settled.  Generally,
when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute
administered by that agency, we first determine ``whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.''  Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984).  Should the statute
be silent or ambiguous on the direct question posed, we
must then decide whether the ``agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.''  Id., at 843.  In
applying these principles, we examine in turn the language
of 10 of the RHA, the decisions of this Court interpreting
it, and the longstanding construction of the Corps in
fulfilling Congress' mandate.

                            A
  Section 10 of the RHA provides in pertinent part:
      ``The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of
any of the waters of the United States is prohibited;
and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the
building of any . . . structures in any . . . water of the
United States . . . except on plans recommended by the
Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill,
or in any manner to alter or modify the course, loca-
tion, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead,
haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge . . . unless
the work has been recommended by the Chief of
Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army
prior to beginning the same.''  33 U. S. C. 403.
  The language of this provision is quite broad.  It flatly
prohibits the ``creation of any obstruction'' to navigable
capacity that Congress itself has not authorized and it bans
construction of any structure in any water of the United
States ``except on plans recommended by the Chief of
Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army.''
Ibid.  The statute itself contains no criteria by which the
Secretary is to make an authorization decision; on its face,
the provision appears to give the Secretary unlimited
discretion to grant or deny a permit for construction of a
structure such as the one at issue in this case.  The Reports
of the Senate and House Committees charged with making
recommendations on the Act contain no hint of whether the
drafters sought to vest in the Secretary the apparently
unbridled authority the plain language of the statute seems
to suggest.  See H.R. Rep. No. 1826, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1899); S. Rep. No. 1686, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1899).
  The statutory antecedents of this provision similarly offer
little insight into Congress' intent.  The precursors to 10
of the 1899 Act were 7 and 10 of the 1890 River and
Harbor Appropriation Act, Act of Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat.
454-455.  Section 10 prohibited creation of ``any obstruction,
not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable
capacity of any waters, in respect of which the United
States has jurisdiction'' and 7 made unlawful the building
of any ``wharf, pier, . . . or structure of any kind outside
established harbor-lines . . . without the permission of the
Secretary of War.''  Ibid.  Congress slightly amended the
statute in 1892 to add a prohibition on any construction
that would ``in any manner . . . alter or modify the course,
location, condition or capacity of any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor of refuge, or inclosure . . . unless approved and
authorized by the Secretary of War.''  1892 Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act, Act of July 13, 1892, 3, 27
Stat. 110.  This statute reflected the reality that Congress
could not itself attend to each such project individually, as
it had from the earliest days of the Republic.  As the House
Report accompanying this law observed: ``The most impor-
tant feature of the bill now presented is the extent it goes
in authorizing the Secretary of War to make contracts for
the completion of some of the more important works of river
and harbor improvement.''  H.R. Rep. No. 967, 52d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1892).  ``The departure from the old driblet
system of appropriations,'' the House Report continued,
``was found to work so well that your committee determined
to apply it on a larger scale than in the last act.''  Ibid.  See
also S. Rep. No. 666, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1892).  By
the time Congress passed the 1899 Act, therefore, the idea
of delegating authority to the Secretary was well estab-
lished even if the explanations for the broad language
employed by Congress to carry out such a directive were
sparse.
                            B
  The substance of the RHA has been unchanged since its
enactment, and the Court has had only a few occasions to
decide whether to construe it broadly or narrowly.  In one
such case, for example, the Court considered whether to
issue a writ of mandamus to order the Secretary of War and
the Chief of Engineers to grant a permit to build a wharf in
navigable waters.  United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern,
289 U. S. 352 (1933).  Although it was stipulated that the
project would not interfere with navigability, the Secretary
nevertheless denied the permit on the ground that the
wharf would impede plans developed by the United States
to create a means of access to the proposed George Wash-
ington Memorial Parkway along the Potomac River in
northern Virginia.  Id., at 355.  The permit applicant
argued that the Secretary's refusal to grant it was contrary
to law on the theory that RHA 10 authorized consider-
ation only of the proposed construction's effects on naviga-
tion.  In refusing to issue the writ of mandamus under
equitable principles, the Court noted that petitioners'
argument could be accepted ``only if several doubtful
questions are resolved in [petitioners'] favor,'' one of which
was ``whether a mandatory duty is imposed upon the
Secretary of War by 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appro-
priation Act to authorize the construction of the proposed
wharf if he is satisfied that it will not interfere with
navigation.''  Id., at 357.
  Nor has such a broad interpretation of the RHA been
exceptional.  In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362
U. S. 482, 491 (1960), the Court observed that ``[w]e read
the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served.
The philosophy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342 [1931], that `A
river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,' forbids a
narrow, cramped reading of either 13 or of 10.''  And as
we stated in a later case: ``Despite some difficulties with the
wording of the Act, we have consistently found its coverage
to be broad.  And we have found that a principal beneficiary
of the Act, if not the principal beneficiary, is the Govern-
ment itself.''  Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389
U. S. 191, 201 (1967) (citations omitted).
  In United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp., 411 U. S. 655 (1973), we applied this broad approach
to the RHA in a somewhat analogous situation under a
provision enacted contemporaneously with 10.  RHA 13
provides that the Secretary of the Army ``may permit the
deposit'' of refuse matter ``whenever in the judgment of the
Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be
injured thereby.''  33 U. S. C. 407.  The case presented the
question whether the statute required the Secretary to
allow such discharges where they had no effect on naviga-
tion.  We held that the statute should not be so construed.
In reaching this conclusion, we observed that ``even in a
situation where the Chief of Engineers concedes that a
certain deposit will not injure anchorage and navigation,
the Secretary need not necessarily permit the deposit, for
the proviso makes the Secretary's authority discretion-
ary-i.e., it provides that the Secretary `may permit' the
deposit.''  411 U. S., at 662.  We further noted that 13
``contains no criteria to be followed by the Secretary in
issuing such permits,'' id., at 668, and rejected the argu-
ment that the agency's statutory authority should be
construed narrowly.
  In our view, 10 should be construed with similar
breadth.  Without specifying the factors to be considered,
10 provides that ``it shall not be lawful to build or com-
mence the building'' of any structure in navigable waters of
the United States ``except on plans recommended by the
Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army.''  33 U. S. C.  403 (emphasis added).  In light of our
holding in Pennsylvania Chemical Corp. that the Secretary's
discretion under 13 was not limited to considering the
effect of a refuse deposit on navigation, it logically follows
that the Secretary's authority is not confined solely to
considerations of navigation in deciding whether to issue a
permit under 10.
                            C
  We now examine the administrative interpretation of 10
down through the years with respect to the range of
discretion extended to the Corps and the Secretary.  An
opinion by Attorney General George W. Wickersham in
1909, for example, denied the Secretary of War and the
Chief of Engineers the authority to decide whether to issue
a permit under RHA 10 after ``consider[ation of] questions
relating to other interests than those having to do with the
navigation of the waters.''  27 Op. Atty. Gen. 284, 288
(1909).
  This narrow view of the Secretary's authority persisted
within the agency for many decades.  ``Until 1968,'' accord-
ing to one document produced by the Corps of Engineers,
``the Corps administered the 1899 Act regulatory program
only to protect navigation and the navigable capacity of the
nation's waters.''  42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (1977).  In 1968, the
regulations were amended so that the general policy
guidance for permit issuance included consideration of ``the
effects of permitted activities on the public interest includ-
ing effects upon water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife,
pollution, our natural resources, as well as the effects on
navigation.'' 33 CFR 209.330(a).
  Yet even after the Corps adopted this more expansive
reading, which the language of the statute and our deci-
sions interpreting it plainly authorized, the House Commit-
tee on Government Operations nevertheless concluded that
the Corps in practice was still not interpreting its statutory
authority broadly enough.  See H.R. Rep. No. 91-917, p. 6
(1970).  The Committee was of the view that the Corps'
earlier ``restricted view of the 1899 act . . . was not required
by the law.''  Id., at 2.  The Report summarized our hold-
ings to the effect that the statutory language of RHA 10
should be interpreted generously, id., at 2-4, and commend-
ed the Corps ``for recognizing [in 1968] its broader responsi-
bilities'' pursuant to its permitting authority under the
RHA.  Id., at 5.  The Committee emphasized that the Corps
``should instruct its district engineers . . . to increase their
emphasis on how the work will affect all aspects of the
public interest, including not only navigation but also
conservation of natural resources, fish and wildlife, air and
water quality, esthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology,
and other public interest aspects of the waterway.''  Id., at
6 (emphasis added).  The Corps did not react to this
-advice- until after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Zabel v.
Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (1970).  There the court upheld the
Corps' consideration of environmental factors in its permit-
ting decision even though the project would not interfere
with navigation, flood control, or power production.  After
this decision, the Corps began the long process of changing
its regulations governing permit application evaluations.
See 42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (1977) (describing historical
background of the agency's practice).  In 1976, the Corps
issued regulations interpreting its statutory authority as
empowering it to take into account a full range of economic,
social, and environmental factors.  See 33 CFR
209.120(f)(1).
  The regulations at issue in this lawsuit, therefore, reflect
a broad interpretation of agency power under 10 that was
consistent with the language used by Congress and was
well settled by this Court and the Army Corps of Engineers.
With respect to the breadth of the Corps' public interest
review, these regulations are substantially the same as
those adopted in 1976 and provide:
      ``(a) Public Interest Review.  (1) The decision whether
to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the
probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the
proposed activity and its intended use on the public
interest.  Evaluation of the probable impact which the
proposed activity may have on the public interest
requires a careful weighing of all those factors which
become relevant in each particular case.  The benefits
which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the
proposal must be balanced against its reasonably
foreseeable detriments.  The decision whether to
authorize a proposal, and if so, the conditions under
which it will be allowed to occur, are therefore deter-
mined by the outcome of this general balancing process.
That decision should reflect the national concern for
both protection and utilization of important resources.
All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must
be considered including the cumulative effects thereof:
among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics,
general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic
properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards,
floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion
and accretion, recreation, water supply and conserva-
tion, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber
production, mineral needs, considerations of property
ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the
people.''  33 CFR 320.4(a)(1) (1991).
These regulations guide the Secretary's consideration of
``public interest'' factors to evaluate in determining whether
to issue a permit under 10 of the RHA.  To the extent
Alaska contends that these regulations are invalid because
they authorize the Secretary to consider a wider range of
factors than just the effects of a project on navigability, we
reject this position.  The State's reading of the Secretary's
regulatory authority in this respect is inconsistent with the
statute's language, our cases interpreting it, and the
agency's practice since the late 1960's.

                           III
  Alaska appears to concede some ground by acknowledging
that the Secretary may not be limited solely to issues of
navigability in considering whether to issue a 10 permit.
The State in effect contends that, even if the statute
authorizes consideration of factors other than just naviga-
bility, the regulations authorizing consideration of a
project's consequences on the federal-state boundary exceed
the Secretary's statutory mandate.  The regulation at issue
provides in pertinent part as follows:
      ``(f) Effects on limits of the territorial sea.  Structures
or work affecting coastal waters may modify the coast
line or base line from which the territorial sea is
measured for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act
and international law. . . .  Applications for structures
or work affecting coastal waters will therefore be
reviewed specifically to determine whether the coast
line or base line might be altered.  If it is determined
that such a change might occur, coordination with the
Attorney General and the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior is required before final action is taken.
The district engineer will . . . request [the Solicitor's]
comments concerning the effects of the proposed work
on the outer continental rights of the United
States. . . .  The decision on the application will be
made by the Secretary of the Army after coordination
with the Attorney General.''  33 CFR 320.4 (1991).
Alaska advances several arguments why such concerns
exceed the scope of the Secretary's authority.  We address
each in turn.
                            A
  Alaska's first argument proceeds from the premise that
the SLA, 43 U. S. C. 1301 et seq., trumps the RHA for
purposes of determining whether the Secretary may
condition issuance of a permit on the State's disclaimer of
sovereignty over the accreted submerged lands.  The SLA
establishes that a coastal State's boundary extends seaward
``to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast
line.''  43 U. S. C. 1312.  The seaward boundary of state-
owned lands is measured from a base line that is subject to
change from natural and artificial alterations.  See United
States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 176-177 (1965); United
States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U. S.
11, 40, n. 48 (1969).  In applying these rules, Alaska asserts
that because the SLA extends a State's boundary seaward
three miles from its coastline and because our decisions
have authorized artificial additions to affect determinations
of the base line, the Army cannot by agency fiat override
the will of Congress, as interpreted by our Court.  Cf.
Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 376
(1986).  According to Alaska, federalism interests should
preclude our finding that the RHA confers power on the
Secretary to condition issuance of a 10 construction permit
on the disclaimer of a change in the preproject federal-state
boundary.  See Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962).
  The United States responds that Congress has already
given the requisite authority to the agency through enact-
ment of the RHA, and that the Secretary appropriately
complied with that statute.  In the Federal Government's
view, the RHA sets out an absolute prohibition on construc-
tion of ``any obstruction'' in navigable waters, 33 U. S. C.
403, and vests discretion in the Secretary of the Army to
grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis when a structure
is recommended by the Army Corps of Engineers.  The
United States maintains that the Secretary has the
discretion to identify relevant considerations for issuing or
denying a permit.  Cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353-354
(1956).
  We find the United States' argument to be the more
persuasive one.  Contrary to Alaska's position, the agency
here is not usurping authority.  The Secretary is making no
effort to alter the existing rights of a State to sovereignty
over submerged lands within three miles of the coastline.
The SLA makes this guarantee and nothing in the Corps'
practice, as exercised in this case, alters this right.  What
the Corps is doing, and what we find a reasonable exercise
of agency authority, is to determine whether an artificial
addition to the coastline will increase the State's control
over submerged lands to the detriment of the United States'
legitimate interests.  If the Secretary so finds, nothing in
the SLA prohibits this fact from consideration as part of the
``public interest'' review process under RHA 10.  Were we
to accept Alaska's position, the Federal Government's
interests in submerged lands outside the State's zone of
control would conceivably become hostage to state plans to
add artificial additions to its coastline.  And if Alaska's
reading of the applicable law were followed to its logical
extreme, the United States would be powerless to protect its
interests in submerged lands if a State were to build an
artificial addition to the coastline for the sole purpose of
gaining sovereignty over submerged lands within the
United States' zone, so long as the project did not affect
navigability or cause pollution.  Alaska points us to nothing
in the SLA or to its legislative history that mandates such
a result.
  It is important to note that neither the SLA itself, nor
any of its legislative history, addresses the question of how
artificial additions to the coastline affect the 3-mile limit, as
we observed in United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139,
176, and n. 50 (1965) (California II).  In that case, however,
we did hold that international law recognized the seaward
expansion of sovereignty through artificial additions to the
coastline.  Id., at 177.  But we also stated that ``the Special
Master recognized that the United States, through its
control over navigable waters, had power to protect its
interests from encroachment by unwarranted artificial
structures, and that the effect of any future changes could
thus be the subject of agreement between the parties.''  Id.,
at 176.  Alaska suggests that this language should not be
read to vest power in the Secretary to condition permits on
sovereignty disclaimers because the Special Master's report
cited by the Court was written prior to enactment of the
SLA.  Brief for Alaska 26 (citing California II, supra, at
143).  This contention fails to persuade us, however,
because we have already noted that the SLA did not
specifically address artificial changes to the coastline, and
because our opinion in California II sanctioned the mecha-
nism exercised by the Secretary in this case:  ``Arguments
based on the inequity to the United States of allowing
California to effect changes in the boundary between federal
and state submerged lands by making artificial changes in
the coastline are met, as the Special Master pointed out, by
the ability of the United States to protect itself through its
power over navigable waters.''  381 U. S., at 177.  Such
``power over navigable waters'' would be meaningless indeed
if we were to accept Alaska's view that RHA 10 permitted
the United States to exercise it only when the State's
project affected navigability or caused pollution.

                            B
  Alaska next contends that our decisions do not permit the
Secretary to consider changes in federal-state boundaries as
part of the 10 ``public interest'' review process.  First, the
State suggests that such consideration would conflict with
our decision in California II, supra, at 176-177.  In that
case we adopted the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U. S. T. 1607,
T. I. A. S. No. 5639, for purposes of the SLA, explaining
that such a result would establish ``a single coastline for
both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and
the conduct of our future international relations (barring an
unexpected change in the rules established by the Conven-
tion).''  381 U. S., at 165.  Because construction of an
artificial port facility will, in certain circumstances, cause
a change in the United States' international seaward
boundary, Alaska contends that the goal of a ``single''
coastline will be frustrated if we permit the Secretary to
establish, in effect, one boundary for international purposes
and a different one for domestic purposes.
  As the United States maintains, however, our decision in
California II did not specify a ``goal'' of achieving a ``single''
coastline.  Rather, our purpose was to give the SLA a
``definiteness and stability.''  Such aims, of course, can be
achieved without creating perfect symmetry between the
Convention and the Act.  Stability in a boundary line is
achieved when the Secretary decides whether a State must
disclaim its rights to accreted submerged lands caused by
artificial additions just as surely as it is with ordinary
coastline determinations occasioned by natural changes.
The State intimates that problems relating to fishing,
salvage operations, and criminal jurisdiction will result
from ``[u]nstable and unpredictable administrative rules
[that] will create confusion in many areas.''  Reply Brief for
Alaska 6.  Such speculative concerns, however, arise only
when the 3-mile boundary itself is indefinite.  But
uncertainty in cases such as this one surely ends when the
State disclaims its sovereignty over accreted submerged
lands.  The three-mile boundary remains the same.  And in
those circumstances in which the Secretary does not require
a disclaimer and the three-mile federal-state boundary
extends from the new base line, presumably should there
arise any of the federal-state problems Alaska identifies,
changes in nautical maps could readily be amended to
reflect such changes.  Nothing in the parties' lodgings with
the Court suggests why fishermen and other sailors who
rely on such charts will suffer prejudice by the rule we
announce today.
  Accordingly, we find no merit in Alaska's argument that,
in conducting the permit review process under RHA 10,
the Secretary cannot consider a project's effects on the
federal-state boundary.
                           IV
  Finally, Alaska maintains that even if the regulations are
authorized by the RHA, the Secretary's actions were not
consistent with those regulations.  The State argues that
nothing in the applicable regulations authorizes the Army
Corps to force a coastal State to abdicate rights to sub-
merged lands as a condition to issuance of a permit for
construction of a shoreline project.  Alaska suggests that
``the regulation addresses activities on submerged lands, not
the property interests in the submerged lands.''  Brief for
Alaska 28.  Nor can the Secretary derive authority to
condition disclaimers on inter-agency coordination responsi-
bilities, according to the State, because 33 CFR 320.4(g)(6)
(1991) states specifically that ``dispute[s] over property
ownership will not be a factor in the Corps' public interest
decision.''  Alaska further posits that the regulations at
320.4(a)(1), which include numerous factors to be evaluat-
ed in balancing the public interest, do not make reference
to the United States' property interests.
  As our analysis in Parts III-A and III-B suggests, we do
not find this argument persuasive.  The regulations indicate
that the Corps may include in its evaluation the -effects of
the proposed work on the outer continental rights of the
United States.-  33 CFR 320.4(f).  It is untenable to
maintain that the legitimate property interests of the
United States fall outside the relevant criteria for a decision
that requires the Secretary to determine whether issuance
of a permit would affect the ``public interest.''  The regula-
tions at 33 CFR 320.4(g)(6), upon which Alaska places
some weight, clearly do not speak to property disputes of
the type at issue here.  Moreover, we are unpersuaded by
Alaska's contention that the authority to require disclaim-
ers cannot be inferred from the regulatory scheme.  It
would make little sense, and be inconsistent with Congress'
intent, to hold that the Corps legitimately may prohibit
construction of a port facility, and yet to deny it the
authority to seek the less drastic alternative of conditioning
issuance of a permit on the State's disclaimer of rights to
accreted submerged lands.
  Alaska also makes various challenges to the administra-
tive procedures followed in this case, and especially to the
alleged shortcoming of the Secretary in not formalizing the
authority to condition disclaimers of sovereignty in the
permit-issuance process.  The ``policy'' followed in this
case, however, is not contrary to law simply because of its
specific omission from the regulations.  See United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U. S. ____, ____ (slip op. 8) (1991) (observing
that some agencies ``establish policy on a case-by-case basis,
whether through adjudicatory proceedings or through
administration of agency programs'').  Certainly the Corps
communicated its intention openly to the appropriate state
officials, and therefore did not force Alaska ```to litigate with
agencies on the basis of secret laws.'''  Renegotiation Bd. v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 9 (1974) (quoting 151
U. S. App. D. C. 174, 181, 466 F. 2d 345, 352 (case below)).
See Joint Stipulation of Facts 24a-25a.  The United States
avers that such disclaimers have been requested on a case-
by-case basis since 1970 and that ``Alaska fails to explain
why the Corps' approach is improper or what specific
advantages would result from identifying the option
through a formal regulation.''  Brief for United States in
Opposition 16.
  We cannot say that in this case the Corps acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.  It notified state officials
promptly that the Solicitor of the Interior Department
objected to issuance of the permit; it specified a curative
option that could be pursued; and it afforded Alaska ample
time to consider the disclaimer, to consult with federal
officials, and then to draft the disclaimer.  See Joint
Stipulation of Facts 2-7, App. to Joint Stipulation of Facts
11a-16a, 17a-19a, 20a-21a, 22a-23a, 24a, 26a-31a.  Nor can
Alaska contend that it lacked notice, since the disclaimer it
filed in this case is similar in form to those which it has
filed in past 10 permit proceedings.  See Joint Lodging of
Permits and Disclaimers.  We conclude that the Corps'
actions in this case were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

                            V
  Accordingly, we hold that the Secretary of the Army acted
within his discretion in conditioning approval of the Nome
port facilities construction permit on a disclaimer by Alaska
of a change in the federal-state boundary that might be
caused by the Nome project.  The United States' motion for
summary judgment is granted, and Alaska's motion for
summary judgment is denied.
                                      It is so ordered.